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Confession and Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting: A 
New Take on the Constitutionality of Abrogating the 
Priest-Penitent Privilege 
There are few crimes that invoke more outrage and disgust than the 
abuse of children. Children are so innocent and helpless, and child abuse 
has such great potential for harm both to the child and to her1 future 
contribution to society, that it is impossible to justify any tolerance for 
such vicious behavior. It should follow, then, that laws that serve to 
reduce the incidence of child abuse or bring its perpetrators to justice 
would be supported wholeheartedly. However, one set of statutes aimed 
at combating this pervasive evil comes into direct conflict with another 
important social value—the privilege and, as I argue, the right of 
individuals to communicate in confidence with spiritual advisors. 
All fifty states have adopted by statute an evidentiary privilege that 
protects certain communications made to clergy. Each of those states 
also has statutes requiring certain classes of people, at risk of criminal 
sanction, to report known or reasonably suspected child abuse. Several of 
these statutes include clergy among the mandatory reporters,2 creating 
the possibility of a conflict between the duty to report and the obligation 
not to reveal confidential communications. While certain statutes relieve 
clergy of their reporting duty when it would conflict with a duty of 
confidentiality protected by privilege, others do not address the issue and 
a few explicitly abrogate the privilege.3 In this Comment I discuss the 
constitutional concerns with abrogation of the priest-penitent privilege, 
also known as the clergy-communicant privilege, in the context of child 
abuse reporting and argue that state statutes allowing a wholesale 
abrogation of the privilege unconstitutionally burden the free exercise 
rights of clergy who have a religious duty to keep communications 
confidential. While narrower reporting statutes may pass constitutional 
scrutiny, I conclude that those which require an affirmative violation of 
religious beliefs impermissibly burden free exercise rights. Narrowly 
tailored reporting statutes would serve the states’ interests in protecting 
1. Needless to say, both male and female children may be subjects of abuse. Similarly, both 
men and women may abuse or neglect children and both men and women may work as spiritual 
counselors. Thus, when I use gendered terms or pronouns in this paper, it is for convenience only 
and should not be read to reinforce gender stereotypes. 
2. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
3. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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children and detecting crime without commanding clergy to violate their 
religious beliefs.4
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the history 
and justification of confidentiality privileges and the constitutional basis 
of the priest-penitent privilege. Part II reviews the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
free-exercise jurisprudence and identifies the constitutional implications 
of reporting statutes that abrogate the priest-penitent privilege. Part III 
argues that broad abrogation of the privilege unconstitutionally burdens 
free exercise of religion and also implicates the constitutional rights to 
freedom from compelled speech, freedom of association, and privacy. I 
conclude that, when subjected to strict scrutiny, any wholesale 
abrogation of the priest-penitent privilege infringes the free exercise 
rights of certain clergy members, particularly Catholic priests. While 
broad mandatory reporting statutes probably serve compelling state 
interests, they are not narrowly tailored to meet that interest. Rather, 
these statutes could be narrowly drawn to further the states’ interests 
without burdening free exercise rights. 
I. HISTORY AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
A.  The Social Value of Evidentiary Privileges 
Evidentiary privileges are generally creatures of statutory law, not 
constitutional rights. As a matter of policy, it makes sense to hold certain 
disclosures sacrosanct. Lawyers, for example, cannot give full and 
accurate legal advice unless they have access to complete information, 
including information that is potentially damaging to the client, and 
clients cannot be expected to reveal such information without a guarantee 
that it will be kept in strict confidence. While the attorney-client 
privilege may be said to inhibit the truth-seeking process by keeping 
relevant information hidden from judges and juries, society’s interest in 
ensuring that all individuals have full and uninhibited access to legal 
counsel outweighs competing concerns. Indeed, any benefit to the truth-
seeking process by allowing disclosure would quickly evaporate as 
clients simply refused to disclose any potentially damaging information.5
4. I reiterate that child abuse cannot be justified and that the state should be vigorous in its 
prevention and punishment. I hope no one will read my argument as an endorsement of any practice 
that would endanger children. 
5. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 (1997) (“In related cases, 
we have said that the loss of evidence admittedly caused by the privilege is justified in part by the 
fact that without the privilege, the client may not have made such communications in the first place. 
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 
This is true of disclosure before and after the client’s death. Without assurance of the privilege’s 
posthumous application, the client may very well not have made disclosures to his attorney at all, so 
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Similar justifications can be made in support of other privileges.6
Medical practitioners and psychological counselors cannot adequately 
treat patients without full information, and preservation of life and health 
outweigh concerns that keeping medical confidences might obscure 
public knowledge of the truth. Spouses are considered important 
confidantes and holders of a sacred trust; any benefits gained by 
requiring spouses to testify against each other would be tainted by the 
violence done to one of society’s most valuable relationships.7 Finally, 
clergy-communicant privileges encourage individuals to seek spiritual 
guidance as a source of comfort and positive direction in their lives.8 In 
light of the sensitive personal information that often must be revealed to 
receive spiritual advice, society’s goal of encouraging the exercise of 
religious duty could not be fully achieved without guarantees of 
confidentiality. While it might be contended that encouraging religious 
exercise in this way crosses some line separating church and state, 9 the 
existence of a statutory clergy-communicant privilege in every state 
suggests that at least some form of the privilege is socially desirable. 
These privileges, however, have limits. For example, lawyers’ duties 
of confidentiality may give way to other ethical duties, such as 
preventing reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.10 And a 
psychotherapist’s duty of confidentiality may be superseded by a duty to 
the loss of evidence is more apparent than real. In the case at hand, it seems quite plausible that 
Foster, perhaps already contemplating suicide, may not have sought legal advice from Hamilton if he 
had not been assured the conversation was privileged.”).
6. The psychotherapist privilege, in particular, has been justified by the Supreme Court by 
reference to the fear that its absence would chill full and frank disclosure. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 
U.S. 1, 11–12 (1996) (“If the [psychotherapist] privilege were rejected, confidential conversations 
between psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled, particularly when it is obvious 
that the circumstances that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in litigation. 
Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants such as petitioner seek 
access—for example, admissions against interest by a party—is unlikely to come into being. This 
unspoken ‘evidence’ will therefore serve no greater truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken 
and privileged.”).
7. See, e.g., State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158, 1172–73 (Conn. 2004) (discussing the 
common law basis for the marital privilege). 
8. See, e.g., State v. Potter, 478 S.E.2d 742, 755 (W. Va. 1996) (“[The clergy-communicant 
privilege] promotes the desirability of securing unhampered the exercise of the religious duty and 
discipline of confession . . . .”); People v. Edwards, 248 Cal. Rptr. 53, 55–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), 
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1158 (1989) (“Justification for the privilege is grounded on societal interests 
in encouraging penitential communication and the development of religious institutions by securing 
the privacy of the penitential communication.”). 
9. See, e.g., Rena Durrant, Comment, Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire (And Brimstone): 
Is it Time to Abandon the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1339, 1362–63 (2006). 
In spite of these arguments, no court has ever invalidated a clergy-communicant privilege statute as 
an establishment of religion. 
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2008). Rule 1.6 also allows the lawyer to 
reveal confidential information when the lawyer’s services have been used to commit a crime or 
fraud, when the lawyer seeks legal advice for himself, when necessary in controversies between the 
lawyer and the client, and when necessary to comply with other law or a court order. Id.
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warn identifiable targets of patient violence.11 Whether such limitations 
are wise is arguable, but surely the state can limit the scope of 
confidentiality privileges that are not mandated by constitutional rights.12
The priest-penitent, or clergy-communicant, privilege, however, is 
unique in that the duty of confidentiality may be religiously mandated 
and, therefore, the clergy member may be entitled to protection from 
compelled disclosure of certain communications as a fundamental human 
right.13
Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of a religion that could 
claim constitutional protection of the clergy-communicant privilege is 
the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church has included 
penance among its sacraments since ancient times, and the duty of priests 
to keep confessions sacred has been part of official canon law since the 
Lateran Council of AD 1215.14 Today, the Seal of Confession is codified 
in canons 983 and 984 of the Code of Canon Law.15 These canons 
prohibit the use of information learned in confession for any reason, even 
if secular law requires it.16 Violation of the Seal is punishable by 
excommunication,17 the Church’s most severe penalty. For Catholic 
clergy, then, the duty of confidentiality transcends human law because 
11. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341–42 (Cal. 1976). But see,
Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 450–51 (Fla. 1991) (“Requiring a psychiatrist to breach [the 
psychiatrist-patient] privilege in order to warn a third party would inhibit the free expression vital to 
diagnosis and treatment and would, thus, undermine the very goals of psychiatric treatment.”).
12. As I indicate below, there may be meritorious arguments that other privileges, in fact, are
mandated by the Constitution. For example, it might be argued that a right to privacy in the marital 
relationship requires a marital privilege. Perhaps the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to effective 
assistance of counsel requires some form of the attorney-client privilege. There could also be 
constitutional concerns if statutory limitations to the privilege were imposed retroactively. All of 
these questions, however, fall outside the scope of this Comment. 
13. While the privilege may belong to the communicant and not the clergy member, this 
Comment focuses on the rights of the clergy member because in the priest-penitent privilege context 
the religious duty binds the clergy, not the penitent and, therefore, it is the clergy member’s religious 
exercise rights that are implicated rather than the penitent’s.
14. Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua, Confidentiality Obligation of Clergy from the Perspective 
of Roman Catholic Priests, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1733, 1734 n.4 (1996). 
15. 1983 CODE c.983, §§ 1–2 (“Can. 983 § 1. The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore it 
is absolutely forbidden for a confessor to betray in any way a penitent in words or in any manner and 
for any reason. §2. The interpreter, if there is one, and all others who in any way have knowledge of 
sins from confession are also obliged to observe secrecy.”); 1983 CODE c.984, §§ 1–2 (“Can. 984 § 
1. A confessor is prohibited completely from using knowledge acquired from confession to the 
detriment of the penitent even when any danger of revelation is excluded. § 2. A person who has 
been placed in authority cannot use in any manner for external governance the knowledge about sins 
which he has received in confession at any time.”).
16. See THE CANON LAW LETTER & SPIRIT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE CODE OF CANON 
LAW 536 (Rt Rev. Mgr Gerard Sheehy et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CANON LAW COMMENTARY]
(“One certain principle which emerges from Cann. 983–984 is that information gained in the 
confessional should be regarded as not having been gained at all and, in so far as is humanly 
possible, should not ever be acted on or spoken of in any way.”).
17. Id. at 799. 
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violation has the potential to put a priest’s very soul in jeopardy. For 
these priests, the claim of right to keep certain confidences inviolate 
transcends any prudential concerns: it stems from a duty to their God. 
B.  History of the Clergy-Communicant Privilege 
While the exact roots of the clergy-communicant privilege have been 
disputed, it is generally accepted that the privilege was not recognized in 
the English Courts of Law.18 In America, the first reported case 
recognizing a privilege is People v. Phillips, decided by the New York 
Court of General Sessions in 1813.19 In Phillips, a Catholic priest refused 
to identify persons who had delivered to him stolen goods for the 
purpose of restoring them to their rightful owner.20 The priest refused to 
testify because he had learned their identity in connection with the 
sacrament of penance.21 Interestingly, in finding the pastor’s testimony 
inadmissible, the court did not justify its decision by reference to public 
policies favoring privilege, but rather based its reasons on the New York 
Constitution.22 The Court declared: 
It is essential to the free exercise of a religion, that its ordinances 
should be administered—that its ceremonies as well as its essentials 
should be protected. . . . Secrecy is of the essence of penance. The 
sinner will not confess, nor will the priest receive his confession, if the 
veil of secrecy is removed: . . . what he receives in confession, is to 
declare that there shall be no penance; and this important branch of the 
Roman [C]atholic religion would be thus annihilated.23
The constitutional underpinnings of Phillips were further highlighted 
four years later in People v. Smith.24 In that case, a New York court 
18. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller & Natasha Leigh Chefetz, Clergy Privilege in Civil and 
Criminal Litigation, in RELIGION & AMERICAN LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 89, 89–90 (Paul 
Finkelman ed., 2000). For an excellent discussion of the development of the priest-penitent privilege 
and argument that it did have roots in the common law, see A. Keith Thompson, Religious 
Confession Privilege at Common Law: A Historical Analysis (Aug. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis. 
Murdoch University (Aust.)), http://wwwlib.murdoch.edu.au/adt/browse/view/adt-
MU20070831.94056. 
19. People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reported in WILLIAM SAMPSON, ANTHONY 
KOHLMANN, JACQUES VANIEÈRE, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (New York, Edward 
Gillespy 1813), judicial opinion reprinted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH.
LAW. 199 (1955). The case was reported by William Sampson, who served as counsel at trial. See
SAMPSON, KOHLMANN, & VANIEÉRE, supra at Title Page. 
20. SAMPSON, KOHLMANN, & VANIEÉRE, supra note 19, at 5–6.
21. Privileged Communications to Clergyman, supra note 19, at 199–200. 
22. Id. at 207. 
23. Id.
24. People v. Smith (N.Y. Ct. of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery, 1817), reprinted in
Privileged Communications to Clergymen, supra note 19, at 209–13.
122 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 24
refused to exclude testimony of a protestant minister regarding 
confessions made to him “as a minister of the gospel.”25 The defense 
counsel, citing Phillips, argued that it would be dangerous to “permit a 
witness . . . to divulge a communication which must, undoubtedly, have 
been made, and ought to have been received, in the strictest 
confidence.”26 The judge, however, “took distinction between auricular 
confessions made to a priest in the course of discipline, according to the 
canons of the church, and those made to a minister of the gospel in 
confidence, merely as a friend or adviser,” and allowed the minister to 
testify.27 The public policy justifying the protection of confidential 
communications to spiritual advisers would certainly have applied in this 
case, as the defendant’s counsel pointed out. However, a broader 
privilege had not yet been adopted by statute in New York and, since the 
minister was willing to testify,28 free exercise concerns did not apply. 
Thus, in America, the priest-penitent privilege was initiated by the 
courts, who strictly limited the privilege to circumstances where a 
constitutional guarantee required it. 
While the task of defining the contours of the privilege in America 
began with courts, legislatures quickly took on that task. In 1828, the 
New York legislature codified the privilege: “No minister of the gospel, 
or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose 
any confessions made to him in his professional character, in the course 
of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination.”29 In 
theory, this statute expanded Phillips so that the privilege encompassed 
confessions without respect to denominations, rather than limiting it to 
confessions to Catholic priests. However, the minister in Smith would 
almost certainly still have been allowed, and probably could have been 
compelled, to testify under the statute since it appeared that he did not 
receive the confession “in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules” 
of his church.30 Since the Catholic Church was probably one of the few, 
if not the only, religions with a sacrament of penance requiring 
confidentiality, the New York statute essentially did nothing more than 
codify Phillips. 
Today, all fifty states and the Federal Rules of Evidence provide a 
privilege protecting certain confidential communications to clergy.31
25. Id. at 210–11.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 211. 
28. Id.
29. Privileged Communications to Clergymen, supra note 19, at 213 (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. 
1828, Pt. 3, c. 7, tit. 3, § 72). 
30. Id.
31. Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant Privilege 
and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1133–35 (2003). 
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Some states have retained a narrow privilege, only recognizing it when 
the communication is made in the course of a church’s discipline,32 while 
others have broadened it enough to extend to all communications meant 
to be confidential and made to a religious leader in his or her ministerial 
capacity.33 The majority of states fall between these extremes, requiring, 
for instance, that the communication be a confession or in pursuit of 
spiritual advice.34 Interestingly, these statutes are generally not justified 
by reference to constitutional rights but appear to be based merely on 
public policy concerns.35
II. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
MANDATORY REPORTING LAWS
A. The Free Exercise Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court—
Employment Division v. Smith 
Today, the constitutional standard required for a law impacting the 
free exercise of religion is stated in Employment Division v. Smith.36
Smith addressed the issue of whether state employees could be fired for 
their use of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug prohibited by law, in 
connection with a sacramental ceremony in their Native American 
church.37 The Supreme Court held that the respondents were not entitled 
to an exception from the law, even if it burdened their practice of 
sincerely held religious beliefs.38 Such laws, the Court held, pass 
constitutional muster as long as they are religiously neutral and generally 
applicable—in other words, as long as they burden religion incidentally 
rather than intentionally.39 In deciding Smith, the Court reasoned that 
allowing anyone to claim exemption from neutral, generally applicable 
32. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062 (2007). For a thorough survey and 
more sophisticated classification of the various states’ standards, see Abrams, supra note 31, at 
1130–35.
33. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146b (2007). 
34. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1133–34. 
35. See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 494 (2009) (“Justification for the clergy-penitent 
privilege is grounded on a societal interest in encouraging penitential communication in the 
development of religious institutions by securing the privacy of the penitential communication.”). 
But see State v. Szemple, 640 A.2d 817, 825–29 (N.J. 1994) (holding that New Jersey statutory 
privilege belongs to the clergyperson and is justified by the clergy’s religious duty).
36. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1989). 
37. Id.
38. Id. at 878–80.
39. Id. at 879. (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes 
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 
252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).”).
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laws on account of religious beliefs would effectively “permit every 
citizen to become a law unto himself.”40
While Justice Scalia’s opinion asserted that the Court’s decision in 
Smith was required by earlier decisions,41 it effectively overruled the 
existing standard for the constitutionality of laws burdening religion 
which the Court had established in Sherbert v. Verner.42 In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that South Carolina could not deny unemployment 
benefits simply because an individual’s religious beliefs mandated that 
she not work on Saturdays.43 Speaking for the majority, Justice Brennan 
had announced that laws which burden free exercise of religion must be 
justified by a compelling state interest which cannot be achieved without 
infringing free exercise rights.44
The Smith court did not expressly overrule Sherbert, or the cases that 
had applied the “compelling state interest” standard, but rather 
distinguished them.45 Justice Scalia declared that the Sherbert test had 
only been used to invalidate state action in the context of unemployment 
compensation and that, on other occasions, the Court had either found 
the test satisfied or abstained from using it.46 Thus, the Court identified 
the unemployment cases as exceptional cases deserving of the 
compelling state interest test.47 While the petitioners in Smith were 
seeking unemployment compensation, the Court did not apply the 
exception because the conduct for which they sought accommodation 
had been prohibited by law—a factor missing from the Sherbert line of 
cases.48
In addition to the “unemployment compensation” exception, the 
Court distinguished a separate group of cases, and one case in 
particular,49 which had invalidated neutral, generally applicable laws. 
40. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878)). 
41. Id. at 878–82. While Justice Scalia argued that the Court’s cases required the result in 
Smith, soon after the decision was handed down Michael McConnell observed that “the primary 
affirmative precedent marshaled by the Court to support its decision consists entirely of overruled 
and minority positions.” Michael McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 
1125 (1990). 
42. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1962).
43. Id. at 410–411. 
44. Id. at 406–07.
45. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883–85.
46. Id. at 882–85.
47. Id. at 884 (“[O]ur decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition that 
where the State has in place a system of individualized exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that 
system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.” (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 708 (1986))). 
48. Id. at 876. 
49. Perhaps the Court’s largest hurdle in justifying its rule in Smith was explaining why the 
popular case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), did not require an exemption. In Yoder, the 
Court held that Wisconsin could not compel the Amish to send their children to high school in 
conflict with their sincerely held religious beliefs without establishing a compelling interest that 
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This distinction created what has become known as the Hybrid Rights 
exception. Justice Scalia explained: 
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment 
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously 
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but 
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, or the right of 
parents to direct the education of their children. Some of our cases 
prohibiting compelled expression, decided exclusively upon free 
speech grounds, have also involved freedom of religion. And it is easy 
to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of association 
grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause 
concerns.50
The logical basis for this distinction seems shaky at best, a problem 
that has been noted by scholars and judges alike. Michael McConnell 
observed that, according to Wisconsin v. Yoder, parents “have no right 
independent of the Free Exercise Clause to withhold their children from 
school, and according to Smith they have no such right under the Free 
Exercise Clause.”51 McConnell thus suspected that “the notion of 
‘hybrid’ claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder
in this case.”52
Since Smith, lower courts have struggled to determine what, if 
anything, the Hybrid Rights exception actually provides. Ostensibly, the 
exception would seem to entitle free exercise plaintiffs to strict scrutiny 
as long as their free exercise claim also involves other rights. However, 
the Sixth Circuit has refused to apply the stricter standard of review, 
even in cases that would seem to warrant it: 
[A]lthough this court in Vandiver, 925 F.2d at 932–33, did discuss 
‘hybrid’ claims, we did not hold that the legal standard under the Free 
Exercise Clause depends on whether a free-exercise claim is coupled 
with other constitutional rights. Such an outcome is completely 
illogical; therefore, at least until the Supreme Court holds that legal 
standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on whether 
other constitutional rights are implicated, we will not use a stricter legal 
could not be furthered in a less restrictive manner. See id., at 215 (“The essence of all that has been 
said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not 
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”).
50. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82 (citations omitted). 
51. McConnell, supra note 41, at 1121. 
52. Id.
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standard than that used in Smith to evaluate generally applicable, 
exceptionless state regulations under the Free Exercise Clause.53
The Second Circuit has adopted the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning54 and, 
while other courts of appeal have acknowledged the existence of an 
exception, none have ever applied it.55 At least one Supreme Court 
Justice has expressed the view that the exception is untenable,56 an 
opinion that encouraged the Sixth Circuit’s reading of Smith.57
The Court’s ruling in Smith triggered public outcry and sparked 
congressional activity. Dissatisfied with the Court’s new rule, Congress 
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), whose stated 
purpose was “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in 
Sherbert v. Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and to guarantee its 
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened . . . .”58 Before long, the Supreme Court pushed back by 
holding RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne 
v. Flores.59 Congress has since enacted the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), which reinstates the 
compelling interest test when certain state action funded by federal aid or 
connected with commerce burdens religious exercise.60 The Supreme 
Court has upheld RLUIPA61 and has applied RFRA to invalidate federal 
government action in a case with facts similar to Smith.62 In general, 
53. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993). 
54. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003). 
55. See Jack Peterson, Exceptions to Employment Division v. Smith: A Need for Change, 10 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 701, 710–16 (2006) (surveying court of appeals’ treatment of the Hybrid 
Rights exception). 
56. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a hybrid claim 
is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception would 
probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the 
situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in 
the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption 
from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional provision, then there 
would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the 
Free Exercise Clause at all.”).
57. See Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180, n.1. 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2008). 
59. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In City of Boerne, the Court invalidated 
RFRA by reasoning that Congress had exceeded the remedial powers granted to it by the 14th 
Amendment. Id. at 529–36. In essence, the Court found that RFRA, as applied to the States, 
represented an attempt by Congress, not to enforce the provisions of the 14th Amendment, but rather 
to interpret the scope of a Constitutional right. Thus, while RFRA exceeds Congress’ power when 
applied to the States, it is valid as applied to the federal government. 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2008). 
61. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
62. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
Significantly, the Court not only applied the compelling interest test, but for the first time in a non-
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however, unless a challenger of a state law restricting free exercise can 
convince a court that the Hybrid Rights exception applies, the law must 
only meet the Smith standard of neutrality and general applicability.63
B.  State Mandatory Reporting Laws and the Priest-Penitent Privilege 
Every state has a statute requiring certain individuals to report 
known or reasonably suspected child abuse, and all but fifteen of them 
include clergy on the list of mandatory reporters.64 Of the thirty-five 
states that require clergy to report child abuse, twenty-two explicitly 
remove the obligation if the grounds for knowledge or suspicion is 
privileged information.65 Seven states are silent on the statutes’ 
application to privileged material, leaving the clergy’s duty ambiguous in 
cases where reporting would conflict with a duty of confidentiality.66 Six 
states explicitly abrogate the privilege.67
Texas’s statute, for instance, requires any person “having cause to 
believe that a child’s physical or mental health or welfare has been 
adversely affected by abuse or neglect by any person” to immediately 
report their suspicions.68 The requirement to report applies  
without exception to an individual whose personal communications 
may otherwise be privileged, including an attorney, a member of the 
clergy, a medical practitioner, a social worker, a mental health 
professional, and an employee of a clinic or health care facility that 
provides reproductive services.69
unemployment compensation case, found the government to have failed to establish a compelling 
interest—the Court held that the government’s interest in uniform application of the Controlled 
Substances Act did not amount to a compelling interest sufficient to justify burdening the appellees’ 
religious practice of using a hallucinogenic tea in their religious ceremonies. Id. at 423. 
63. This standard does require more than facial neutrality. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye v. City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court struck down a law that was worded without reference to 
religion but was obviously aimed at suppressing religious practice. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
64. See Abrams, supra note 31, at 1138–39.
65. Id. at 1139. 
66. Id.
67. Id. The six states are New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, 
and West Virginia. 
68. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(a) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2002).
69. Id. § 261.101(c) (emphasis added). The Texas statute is unique (although Oklahoma also 
does so implicitly) in including the attorney-client privilege among those abrogated for purposes of 
reporting child abuse. While only Texas and Oklahoma impose a mandatory duty to report, lawyers 
do not have a strong argument that such a duty conflicts with their ordinary duty of confidentiality. 
Lawyers probably could not be disciplined even for voluntarily reporting ongoing child abuse 
despite their duty of confidentiality on the theory that it is necessary “to prevent reasonably certain 
death or substantial bodily harm.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2008). 
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Texas not only abrogates privileges with regard to reporting, it also does 
away with most privileges at trial: “In a proceeding regarding the abuse 
or neglect of a child, evidence may not be excluded on the ground of 
privileged communication except in the case of communications between 
an attorney and client.”70 The Texas Court of Appeals did not hesitate to 
apply these statutes in admitting testimony of a clergyman regarding a 
defendant’s confession to sexually abusing his three children.71
Neither the courts of Texas, nor any other state, have addressed the 
constitutionality of these statutes. However, those that broadly abrogate 
the priest-penitent privilege implicate a number of constitutional rights. 
For clergy with a religious duty to keep communications confidential, 
these laws undeniably burden their freedom to exercise their religion. 
The duty to report also implicates freedom from compelled speech, 
freedom of association, and privacy. There is considerable commentary 
discussing the merits of potential constitutional challenges to reporting 
statutes.72 However, the discussion is far from closed. 
III. ABROGATION OF THE PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE AND FREE 
EXERCISE: INVOKING STRICT SCRUTINY THROUGH THE HYBRID RIGHTS 
EXCEPTION
It may seem strange to base any argument on Smith’s Hybrid Rights 
exception in light of the negative treatment it has received in the lower 
courts and in the scholarly literature. However, the exception has never 
been renounced by the Supreme Court and the cases upon which it is 
based have technically never been overruled. Furthermore, while a 
Hybrid Rights claim is by no means a sure winner, religious exercise 
claims can strengthen free speech or substantive due process claims73
and, unless the state law is persecutory,74 the Hybrid Rights exception 
may be the only way to challenge a law that burdens religious exercise. 
70. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.202 (Vernon 1996). 
71. Bordman v. State, 56 S.W.3d 63, 67–68 (Tex. App. 2001). The Bordman court did not 
address the constitutionality of the statutes, presumably because the clergyman did not object to 
testifying. 
72. See, e.g., Andrew A. Beerworth, Treating Spiritual and Legal Counselors Differently: 
Mandatory Reporting Laws and the Limitations of Current Free Exercise Doctrine, 10 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73 (2004); Julie M. Arnold, Note, “Divine” Justice and the Lack of Secular 
Intervention: Abrogating the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in Mandatory Reporting Statutes to 
Combat Child Sexual Abuse, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 849 (2008); Caroline E. Law, Comment, Holding 
Clergy Accountable: Maryland Should Require Clergy to Report Suspected Child Abuse, 34 U.
BALT. L. REV. 337, 357–60 (2005); Christopher R. Pudelski, Comment, The Constitutional Fate of 
Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in a Post-Smith World, 98 
NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2004). 
73. See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
74. Such laws, though rare, have been passed and challenged. See Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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Furthermore, a challenge based on a legitimate claim to the Hybrid 
Rights exception might encourage the Supreme Court to reconsider 
whether the Free Exercise Clause should, in practice, prohibit no more 
than laws with distinctly religious animus.75
A. Seeking Relief in Federal Court 
Perhaps the reason courts have not had to consider the free-exercise 
implications of requiring clergy to report child abuse is that the ideal case 
for challenging the constitutionality of mandatory reporting statutes 
would have to fit very particular facts. Ideally, such a case would 
contemplate penitent-initiated confession to a clergy member of a 
denomination wherein confession and confidentiality are mandated by 
the church’s “course of discipline,” who does nothing beyond hear the 
confession and counsel the penitent.76 The underlying suit would either 
be a criminal prosecution against the priest for failure to report or a civil 
suit seeking damages for negligence in failing to report. A suit against 
the abuser, where the prosecution seeks to include privileged information 
as evidence and the priest objects, would be largely irrelevant, because 
(1) the communications could actually be entered into evidence in only a 
small handful of states (most statutes only require the clergy to report, 
but preserve the privilege in proceedings) and (2) the priest would first 
have to risk a contempt citation to appeal the law’s validity. 
Additionally, since the reporting statutes apply to extra-judicial 
circumstances, and the statutes granting privilege are worded in terms of 
admissibility of evidence, a challenge under these circumstances might 
not resolve the question of whether the privilege can be claimed to avoid 
reporting child abuse. 
The chances of the ideal case occurring in the real world appear to be 
slim, if only because violations of the reporting law may be difficult to 
detect.77 However, the improbability of such an ideal case could work to 
75. Cf. Beerworth, supra note 72. 
76. That the clergy member does not use the information beyond counseling in the 
confessional is an important fact. See infra, Part III.C. 
77. Certainly, the abuser cannot be expected to volunteer evidence of his own confession 
and, given the clergy member’s duty to keep the communication in strict confidence, evidence of the 
confession’s occurrence would seem to be scanty at best. On the other hand, there may be scenarios 
where evidence of a clergy member’s failure to report would arise. For instance, a victim of abuse or 
third party who knows about the abuse might come to his priest with the information along with a 
request that the priest keep the communication secret. That same individual might later sue or press 
charges against the priest for failure to report. This scenario has its own problems. First, it may well 
be that the communication in question could not be considered a “confession” within the arguably 
constitutionally protected scope of the privilege. Second, if the victim herself requests the priest to 
keep the communication confidential, it seems unlikely that that person would turn around and press 
charges against the priest for honoring the request. 
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a potential challenger’s advantage. The Supreme Court has stated that 
plaintiffs seeking to contest the constitutionality of a criminal statute 
need not first expose themselves to actual arrest or prosecution as long as 
they can establish that the threat of prosecution is likely.78 Assuming that 
a clergyman with an unqualified duty of confidentiality could prove that 
he had been threatened with prosecution under a state reporting statute,79
he could seek a declaratory judgment in a United States federal district 
court that such a statute unconstitutionally burdened his right to free 
exercise of religion.80 Bringing this kind of direct challenge would allow 
the applicants to avoid damaging facts that might be present in a real-life 
case and would also serve the purpose of isolating the constitutional 
issue. 
B.  Initiating Strict Scrutiny with a Hybrid Claim 
For whatever reason, no religious organization has yet brought a 
challenge to a mandatory reporting law that requires clergy to report 
child abuse in spite of a bona fide conflict with religiously mandated 
duties of confidentiality. If such a challenge were brought, the Court 
would likely apply the constitutional standard established in Employment 
Division v. Smith. An argument that these statutes are not neutral or 
generally applicable would almost certainly fail.81 None of the statutes 
single out a particular religion or religious belief for a burden and, while 
several of them require only certain groups of professionals to report, 
clergy are by no means singled out for more onerous treatment. Indeed, 
most statutes impose reporting obligations on several classes of 
professionals who might discover abuse through relationships of trust, 
including some who normally enjoy evidentiary privileges.82
78. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (“In these circumstances, it is not 
necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to 
challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.”).
79. The facts necessary to prove a threat of prosecution are not entirely clear, while the Court 
has said that a plaintiff should not be placed “between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law 
and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity.” Id. at 462. 
In Steffel, the plaintiff actually had violated the law and been threatened with prosecution. Id. at 459. 
However, if the plaintiff and the state were to stipulate that the plaintiff actually was under threat of 
prosecution, a clergy member should have standing to challenge the law in federal district court. 
80. The plaintiff could seek a declaratory judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
authorizes suits in equity for deprivations of Constitutional rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2000). 
81. A good argument could be made that these statutes are not substantively neutral. That is, 
the effect of the law is to place a heavier burden on a particular class than the rest of society. 
However, as Justice Souter noted in his concurrence in The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City 
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 561–62 (1993), the rule laid down in Smith requires only formal neutrality. 
It would be difficult to argue that any of the mandatory reporting statutes have, as their object, the 
suppression of religious practice. 
82. These professionals include physicians, psychotherapists, teachers, and even attorneys. 
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Considering the neutral and general character of the laws in question, 
successful challenges would be possible only if the challenger can 
initiate heightened scrutiny. As the Smith Court noted,83 even neutral and 
generally applicable laws may be invalid if they implicate constitutional 
concerns beyond the free exercise of religion.84 Mandatory reporting 
statutes may fall within the Hybrid Rights exception because they 
involve, not only religious exercise rights, but also free speech rights85
and substantive due process liberty rights.86
1.  Freedom of speech
Free speech rights include not only freedom to express oneself, but 
also freedom to refrain from expression. This right to remain silent may 
be circumscribed by other concerns, such as the duty to testify in a 
criminal proceeding pursuant to a subpoena, without offending the 
Constitution. However, when compelled expression conflicts with 
sincerely held religious beliefs, the Hybrid Rights exception suggests that 
the state must yield unless it can demonstrate a narrowly tailored, 
overriding state interest. 
In the landmark case, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
the Supreme Court held the Board of Education’s refusal to exempt 
Jehovah’s Witnesses from flag salute ceremonies unconstitutional.87 The 
Jehovah’s Witness children refused to salute the flag, claiming that it 
represented an “image” and that saluting it would constitute a violation 
of a biblical commandment forbidding the worship of images.88 The 
Court concluded that compulsory observance of a flag ceremony 
constituted “compulsion . . . to declare a belief.”89 Such an “involuntary 
affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and 
States that require all persons to report regardless of privileges would abrogate the marital privilege 
as well. 
83. Though, perhaps, disingenuously. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
84. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1989). 
While I believe this issue is the prime example of a case that would qualify for the “hybrid-rights” 
exception, I must admit that the exception’s actual practical viability remains untested and has been 
brought into serious doubt. See Beerworth, supra note 72, at 80–81 (2004). 
85. In establishing the exception, the Smith court specifically identified free speech cases that 
concerned free exercise—Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) and West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
86. While substantive due process rights were not included in the list of hybrid cases 
contemplated by Smith, the Court in that case did invite the possibility of the combination of novel 
constitutional claims. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (“[I]t is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on 
freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns.” 
(quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984))). 
87. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
88. Id. at 629. 
89. Id. at 631. 
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urgent grounds than [the clear and present danger standard required to 
justify censorship].”90
Another Supreme Court case, Wooley v. Maynard, reaffirmed 
Barnette by invalidating a New Hampshire law requiring the state motto, 
“Live Free or Die,” to be displayed on the license plates of 
noncommercial vehicles.91 The Maynards, followers of the Jehovah’s 
Witness faith, found the motto “repugnant to their moral, religious, and 
political beliefs” and covered the words on their license plate in violation 
of the statute.92 The Court considered whether “the State may 
constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination 
of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a 
manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the 
public” and held that it could not.93
While the situations are not identical, mandatory reporting statutes 
compel speech in ways that are similar to the statutes struck down in 
Barnette and Wooley. As in Barnette, the law requires individuals to 
affirmatively violate a sincerely held religious belief by forcing them to 
engage in expression which their religion forbids. And, going beyond 
Wooley, compliance with the law is more than morally repugnant—it 
places these individuals in fear of removing themselves from favor with 
God. Indeed, the duty of keeping confidences is strong enough that 
individuals are willing to suffer physical punishment rather than breach 
their duty.94
90. Id. at 633. 
91. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
92. Id. at 707–08.
93. Id. at 713. 
94. See, e.g., In re Williams, 152 S.E.2d 317, 321 (N.C. 1967) (“‘REVEREND WILLIAMS: 
I will not testify in this case under any circumstances.’”); CANON LAW COMMENTARY, supra note 
16, at 535 (“Put simply, the priest is strictly forbidden to reveal by any means whatever anything the 
penitent may have disclosed to him.”). In the early New York case, People v. Phillips, discussed 
above, the priest objecting to testimony explained his position to the court thus: 
Were I summoned to give evidence as a private individual . . . and to testify from those 
ordinary sources of information from which the witnesses present have derived theirs, I 
should not for a moment hesitate, and should even deem it a duty of conscience to declare 
whatever knowledge I might have; as, it cannot but be in the recollection of this same 
honorable Court, I did, not long since, on a different occasion, because my holy religion 
teaches and commands me to be subject to the higher powers in civil matters, and to 
respect and obey them. But if called upon to testify in quality of a minister of a 
sacrament, in which my God himself has enjoined on me a perpetual and inviolable 
secrecy, I must declare to this honorable Court, that I cannot, I must not answer any 
question that has a bearing upon the restitution in question; and that it would be my duty 
to prefer instantaneous death or any temporal misfortune, rather than disclose the name of 
the penitent in question. For, were I to act otherwise, I should become a traitor to my 
church, to my sacred ministry and to my God. In fine, I should render myself guilty of 
eternal damnation. 
SAMPSON, KOHLMANN & VANIEÈRE, supra note 19, at 8–9.
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On the other hand, arguments could be made that mandatory 
reporting requirements are distinguishable from the laws struck down in 
Barnette and Wooley. For instance, the plaintiffs in both Barnette and 
Wooley based their complaints on the grounds that the laws compelled 
them to express a belief or publicly endorse a particular ideological 
message. Mandatory reporting laws, on the other hand, simply compel 
the disclosure of facts.95 It is uncontroversial that the state can compel 
disclosure of certain facts, even absent the issuance of a subpoena—for 
instance, every taxpayer knows that the state does not need to obtain a 
subpoena to compel them to disclose their income in a tax return. 
However, there is no per se rule that the state may always compel 
speech when it only requires disclosure of facts. In Riley v. National 
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that a 
compelled disclosure of facts, such as the amount of funds collected by a 
charity fundraiser that would actually be turned over to charity, 
constituted compelled speech subject to strict scrutiny.96 The Court 
declared that its earlier compelled speech cases, such as Barnette and 
Wooley, were based on the principle that “[t]he right to speak and the 
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the 
broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”97 The compelling state 
interests implicated by laws that require witnesses to testify or taxpayers 
to report their income are, perhaps, simply so obvious that their 
constitutional propriety cannot be questioned. Requiring other factual 
disclosures, however, cannot always be so easily justified. 
Thus, as long as the individual would not otherwise make the 
statement, even compulsion to disclose facts interferes with this freedom 
of mind and, therefore, falls within the protections of the First 
Amendment.98 The disclosures required by mandatory reporting laws, 
therefore, would also fall within those protections. Of course, simply 
because the compelled speech merits First Amendment protection does 
not mean the state cannot compel it. Rather, it means that the courts must 
review the statute with strict scrutiny. Perhaps the state would succeed in 
demonstrating a compelling state interest and narrow tailoring on the 
speech claim. But if the presence of a serious free speech claim initiates 
the Hybrid Rights exception, then the challenger will have succeeded in 
obtaining strict scrutiny for the free exercise claim as well. 
95. Many reporting laws do actually invoke a reporting duty when there is a “reasonable 
belief” that a child is being abused. It seems fairly obvious that this type of “belief” is different in 
kind from the type contemplated in Barnette and Wooley. 
96. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795–801 (1988) (applying strict 
scrutiny and invalidating a North Carolina law that compelled charity fundraisers to disclose in their 
solicitations facts such as the amount that would actually be turned over to charity). 
97. Id. at 797 (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714). 
98. See id.
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2. Fundamental liberty interests 
While the mandatory reporting laws should trigger strict scrutiny 
under the Hybrid Rights exception solely on First Amendment claims, a 
litigant could also argue that these reporting laws, as applied to clergy 
with religiously mandated duties of confidentiality, violate fundamental 
liberty rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The relationship enjoyed between a priest and confessor is 
extremely intimate and deserving of the utmost privacy.99 Mandatory 
reporting laws that require the priest to break the sacred trust inherent in 
the priest-penitent relationship, or prevent the priest and penitent from 
establishing such a relationship, are beyond the scope of activity 
government can regulate without demonstration of a compelling interest. 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that “specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . .
Various guarantees create zones of privacy.”100 The obligation to 
guarantee these rights is applied to the states by virtue of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.101 In Griswold, the Court 
invalidated a state law that made it illegal to use contraceptives or to 
“assist[], abet[], counsel[], cause[], hire[] or command[] another” to do 
so.102 It reasoned that the marital relationship came within the “zone of 
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”103 The 
statutes in question, therefore, impermissibly intruded upon that privacy. 
The Court has on numerous occasions utilized the principle of 
“zones of privacy” articulated in Griswold to identify fundamental 
constitutional rights. For instance, the Court has held that an individual’s 
right to marry is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a fundamental right,104 that a woman has the right to 
choose to have an abortion,105 and that the state may not interfere with 
the choice of adults to engage in homosexual intercourse in private.106
The idea that certain aspects of a person’s life are outside the scope of 
99. The existence of statutes establishing a clergy-communicant privilege in every state 
demonstrates society’s recognition that the relationship is entitled to privacy. 
100. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
516–22 (1960)). 
101. Id. at 482. 
102. Id. at 480. 
103. Id. at 485. 
104. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–54 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
106. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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government interference has been a recurrent theme for the Supreme 
Court.107
While the doctrine of substantive due process is complex and 
controversial, and the Court exercises caution when extending the status 
of “fundamental right” to particular actions,108 there is a good argument 
that a guarantee of confidentiality in religious confession falls within the 
penumbras of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
First, the priest-penitent relationship implicates the protected 
freedom of association. This right, emanating from the First Amendment, 
includes a right of privacy in one’s associations.109 In NAACP v. 
Alabama, the Court invalidated a law that required the NAACP to 
disclose lists of its members, finding that such a requirement constituted 
an “effective . . . restraint on freedom of association.”110 Certainly, 
compelled disclosure of the contents of a clergy communication would 
have the same effect. The clergy-communicant relationship, while as 
small as an association can be (i.e., two individuals), is an association. 
Knowledge that communications might be required to be reported to a 
government agency undoubtedly restrains the freedom to associate 
because such a report would necessarily reveal the existence of the 
underlying association, a revelation which the government cannot 
compel under NAACP v. Alabama. If the government cannot compel 
disclosure of the existence of an association, then it would be anomalous 
to say that it can compel disclosure of the contents of a meeting 
conducted by that association. 
The right to privacy in the confessional may also arise under the 
penumbra of the Fourth Amendment. In Griswold, the Court reaffirmed 
that the Fourth Amendment’s specific guarantee of the “‘right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures’” creates a “‘‘right to privacy, no less 
important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the 
107. See, e.g., id. at 578 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847) (“‘It is a promise of the Constitution 
that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.’”).
108. Indeed, even while striking down laws under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court has hesitated to elevate conduct to the status of “fundamental rights.” In 
dissenting from Lawrence, Justice Scalia observed that, while the majority overruled the outcome of 
Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld anti-sodomy laws, it did not actually overrule its “central 
legal conclusion: ‘[R]espondent would have us announce . . . a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do.’” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1973)). Thus, while the Court in 
Lawrence held that Texas’s anti-sodomy law infringed petitioners’ liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not explicitly hold that individuals have a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual intercourse. 
109. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“This Court has recognized the vital 
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.”).
110. Id.
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people.’”111 This right to privacy extends to individuals whenever they 
have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, . . .
[that expectation is] one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”112 Perhaps an expectation of privacy does not exist for 
communications with clergy in all churches. However, in most 
confessional settings, both the clergy member and the penitent probably 
expect the communication to be confidential. Even when a third party is 
present, for example when translation services are required, that third 
party may be bound by a duty of confidentiality commensurate with the 
clergy member’s duty.113 Judging from the existence of testimonial 
privileges protecting clergy-communicant communications in all fifty 
states, it seems self-evident that the expectation of privacy in confession 
is one that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”114 Thus, 
both clergy and communicant are entitled to the privacy protections of 
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure. 
While the confessional is almost certainly protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, it is less clear whether requiring clergy to report the 
contents of a confession that raises a suspicion of child abuse constitutes 
a search. It would be manifestly unconstitutional for an agent to 
surreptitiously record the contents of a confession without a warrant.115
But is it likewise unconstitutional to require the recipient of the 
confession to report that same information? After all, the reporter could 
use discretion in the amount of the conversation he reveals and probably 
would not consider himself an agent of the state in the general sense.116
Even if the clergy member does consider himself an agent, The Supreme 
Court has held that wrongdoers who reveal their crimes to third parties 
assume the risk that those parties are working with the police,117 so it 
111. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 656 (1963)). 
112. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
113. See 1983 CODE c.983, § 2 (“The interpreter, if there is one, and all others who in any way 
have knowledge of sins from confession are also obliged to observe secrecy.”). 
114. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
115. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
116. However, it is possible the clergy member would be considered an agent in practice. 
Searches performed by private parties as agents of the government are subject to the same 
restrictions placed on government searches. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATIVE CASES AND COMMENTARY 77–78 (8th ed. 
2007). In determining whether a private party is acting as an agent, “the question is whether the 
private person believed at the time . . . that her action had been explicitly or implicitly requested or 
required by police or other government agents, who had reason to know that their actions might well 
give rise to such belief or that such a belief existed.” Id. Thus, from the penitent’s perspective, the 
clergy member might be considered an agent of the government if he has a duty to report certain 
communications. 
117. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). 
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might be argued that confessions do not constitute searches because they 
are volunteered by the penitent. 
These arguments, however, are beside the point. Whether the duty to 
report implicates the penitent’s Fourth Amendment rights is an 
interesting question, but it is distinct from the question whether the duty 
to report implicates the clergy member’s rights. As a party to the 
confidential communication, the clergy member has a right to security of 
his person. Requiring him to report the contents of a confidential 
communication has the same consequence as wiretapping his office—the 
private communication reaches a party for which it was not intended 
without the consent of either party. 
On the other hand, perhaps both the penitent and the priest lose their 
expectation of privacy by virtue of the law’s existence. Katz requires not 
only that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable, but also that the individual actually expect privacy.118 Thus, 
even if the society is prepared to recognize religious confession as 
deserving of privacy, individuals cannot reasonably expect privacy when 
the law provides otherwise. Justice Harlan, the author of the Katz test, 
himself recognized this vulnerability in his test and expressed concern 
that states might circumvent legitimate privacy rights in this manner.119 If
the state can eliminate the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy at 
will, the protection offered by Katz would seem fairly thin.120 In any 
event, imposing a duty to report one’s own private communications 
seriously intrudes upon personal privacy. Even if the Katz test does not 
fit comfortably when a law eliminates a person’s expectation of privacy, 
the implications of the Fourth Amendment remain. 
Finally, privacy rights in the priest-penitent relationship may arise 
from the nature of the relationship itself. The Supreme Court has held the 
marital relationship and private sexual relationships to be beyond the 
scope of government interference short of a demonstration of compelling 
interest. The priest-penitent relationship may deserve similar protection. 
118. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
119. See White, 401 U.S. at 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The analysis must, in my 
view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our 
expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the 
customs and values of the past and present.”).
120. Cf. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 384 (1974) (“[An actual, subjective expectation of privacy] can neither add to, nor can its 
absence detract from, an individual’s claim to fourth amendment protection. If it could, the 
government could diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by 
announcing . . . that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic 
surveillance.”); Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, 
or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 367–68 (1998) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment 
creates, not a right of privacy, but a right to exclude others from personal matters). 
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The priest-penitent relationship is certainly as private as marital or 
sexual relationships. In a spiritual sense, the relationship is also quite 
intimate. The faithful parishioner may reveal information about herself to 
her priest that she would not reveal to any other person in the entire 
world—including her spouse. The priest, in turn, gives counsel, comfort, 
and absolution not available from any other person in the world. For 
religions that view the priest as God’s personal representative, this kind 
of relationship cannot be replicated with any other being. Thus, the 
principles that support the prohibitions on state interference with marital 
and other sexual relationships should also apply to other relationships 
that rise to a similar level in an individual’s journey for personal 
fulfillment. The priest-penitent relationship has played such a significant 
role in the lives of individuals for centuries. 
It may be noted that these arguments for fundamental liberty rights 
would require the Supreme Court to expand its jurisprudence to a 
significant degree. Whether challenges to mandatory reporting laws that 
abrogate the priest-penitent privilege under these arguments would 
succeed is a difficult question. However, if the Hybrid Rights exception 
is to have any meaning, the liberty rights implicated by abrogation of the 
privilege should at least be enough to invoke strict scrutiny for the free 
exercise claims. 
C.  Application of Strict Scrutiny 
If a challenger were to succeed in bringing the clergy-communicant 
privilege within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s Hybrid Rights 
exception, the burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest would 
fall upon the state defending its mandatory reporting law.121 At first 
blush, it would seem that the state’s compelling interest is obvious. What 
could be more compelling than protecting children from abuse or 
neglect? The state may argue that clergy are more likely than the general 
population to have information regarding child abuse and, therefore, are 
in a better position than most to assist the state in preventing its 
continuance. 
The state might also argue that reporting child abuse is necessary to 
prevent problems that arise when clergy attempt to solve the problem 
“in-house.”122 These attempts at extra-legal solutions often exacerbate 
121. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–08 (1962).
122. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON 30–52
(2003), http://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/resource-files/reports/ReillyReport.pdf
[hereinafter, REILLY REPORT] (reporting actions of Catholic authorities in dealing with allegations of 
child sex abuse by priests in the Archdiocese of Boston). 
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the problem by perpetuating abuse.123 As a rather disturbing example, in 
January 2002, the Boston Globe initiated a string of publicity 
surrounding rampant child sexual abuse by priests in the Catholic 
Church.124 The article publicly revealed the serial child sexual abuse by 
Catholic priest, John Geoghan, who, despite recognized patterns of 
predatory sexual behavior, was allowed to work with children for over 
three decades.125 The article catalogued claims that church authorities 
discouraged families of victims from reporting abuse and alleged that 
higher authorities within the church covered up scandals by settling with 
complaining families on terms of confidentiality and moving trouble 
priests to new locations where their abuse continued.126
While the Boston scandal did not involve refusal to report child 
abuse on grounds of clergy-communicant privilege, it highlighted the 
disastrous consequence of allowing a church to attempt to solve 
problems of child abuse within its own ranks. Churches may make 
claims to spiritual guidance, but the state most assuredly has the stronger 
claim to its citizens’ physical protection and mandatory reporting laws 
ensure the state receives notice when it needs to address a problem of 
child abuse. 
Furthermore, states may argue that carving out an exception for 
clergy when their information is privileged creates ambiguity in the 
reporting statute because clergy may be uncertain whether their 
suspicions of child abuse arise from privileged communications or 
nonprivileged observations. Knowledge or reasonable suspicion of child 
abuse may often arise out of non-confessional circumstances. Indeed, 
obtaining knowledge or suspicion of abuse through confession by the 
abuser is probably the exception, not the rule. Instead, a priest might 
notice bruises on a child’s arm, or even emotional signals that would 
indicate child abuse. Perhaps the wife of an abuser or mother of a victim 
comes to her religious leader seeking guidance on what to do.127 In some 
instances, the child will go to the clergy member for help.128 In the 
123. Id. at 30 (“By practice and policy, information concerning the complaints of abuse was 
shared with only a small number of senior Archdiocese officials, and only these officials were 
responsible for fashioning a response to the harm to children in the Archdiocese. As a result, the 
response by the Archdiocese reflected tragically misguided priorities. Top Archdiocese officials 
regularly addressed and supported the perceived needs of offending priests more than the needs of 
children who had been, or were at risk of being, abused.”).
124. Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years Aware of Geoghan 
Record, Archdioceses Still Shuttled Him from Parish to Parish, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at A1; 
see also REILLY REPORT, supra note 122, at 34–47.
125. Rezendes, supra note 124, at A1. 
126. Id.
127. This type of situation would involve communications that, though not confessional, may 
still be confidential. Therefore, such communications could still fall within the broad clergy-
communicant privilege existing in many states. 
128. See, e.g., Doe v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
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Geoghan case, higher authorities in the church discovered Geoghan’s 
abuse completely outside the confessional.129
In any case, once the clergy member’s suspicion has been aroused 
through a confession, other signs of abuse may become more noticeable. 
The clergy member, however, may still feel an obligation to refrain from 
reporting because they would not have noticed the signs without having 
been alerted by the communication.130 Thus, the clergy member might 
reasonably believe that the duty to report a particular individual no 
longer applies once she has received a privileged communication. Such 
an exception could create perverse incentives for child abusers. Abusers 
who suspect their priest believes their victim has been abused might rush 
to confess—not to obtain forgiveness or help, but rather to prevent the 
priest from reporting them. 
These arguments are persuasive and, ultimately, the state probably 
would prove a compelling interest. However, the clergy members may 
have valid arguments of their own negating the state’s argument. First, 
states that abrogate the privilege assume that clergy are, in fact, in a 
special position to receive information regarding child abuse in their role 
as confessors. Presumably, this assumption is based on the expectation 
that, if a religion requires confession, abusers who are religious will 
confess to the sin of abuse and, therefore, clergy will be more likely than 
the average person to receive information regarding the abuse. 
However, even if we accept the rather unlikely premise that child 
abusers will confess their crimes absent a guarantee of confidentiality, 
the assumption disregards the context in which the clergy member 
receives that information. For Catholics, at least, confession places the 
priest in the position of God’s intermediary as “at once both judge and 
healer,” and as “constituted by God as a minister of both divine justice 
and divine mercy.”131 Thus, from the priest’s perspective, he receives the 
information entirely outside his personal capacity and must disclaim any 
personal knowledge of the confession at all.132 Priests of the Catholic 
167 P.3d 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (involving a teenage girl that allegedly reported sexual abuse 
by her stepfather to her bishop, who failed to report the abuse). 
129. See Rezendes, supra note 124, at A1; REILLY REPORT, supra note 122, at 34–47.
130. Canon 984 of the Catholic Canon Law forbids a confessor from ever “[using] knowledge 
acquired in confession to the detriment of the penitent” and also forbids persons in authority from 
using knowledge about sins acquired in confession in any way for external governance. 1983 CODE 
c.984, §§ 1–2. Commentaries on these canons caution against any behavior that “could give rise to 
the suspicion that [a priest] is careless about the seal . . . .” CANON LAW COMMENTARY, supra note 
16, at 536. Thus, it seems likely that priests would prefer not to report even non-privileged 
information when it is connected to a confession in any meaningful way. 
131. See 1983 CODE c.978, § 1 (“In hearing confessions the priest is to remember that he is at 
once both judge and healer, and that he is constituted by God as a minister of both divine justice and 
divine mercy, so that he may contribute to the honour of God and the salvation of souls.”).
132. “One certain principle which emerges from Cann. 983–984 is that information gained in 
the confessional should be regarded as not having been gained at all and, in so far as is humanly 
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Church, therefore, might claim that they are not in any position to receive 
information about child abuse through the sacrament of penance because 
they are religiously mandated to treat any information they receive in 
confession as not having been revealed to them at all. If clergy have a 
religious duty to treat confidential communications as if they had not 
been made, then imposing a duty to report will not actually further the 
state’s interest because the clergy with the duty of confidentiality will act 
as if the duty never arises. 
Of course, this doctrinal argument that the priest does not actually 
have “personal” knowledge will probably only be persuasive to those 
who subscribe to Catholic theology—treating the communication as if it 
had not been received does not mean the conversation did not actually 
happen. However, other considerations cast doubt upon the validity of 
the state’s assumption. If the state places a reporting duty on clergy 
based on the expectation that clergy are in a unique position to receive 
information about child abuse through confession, and the clergy have an 
absolute religious obligation to keep confessions confidential which they 
will not break for any reason, then one of two things can be expected to 
happen. On the one hand, clergy might encourage penitents not to 
confess anything that would create the duty to report, thus reducing the 
incidence of their having to break the law and eliminating any advantage 
they have in gathering information. Or, on the other hand, the clergy 
might simply flout the law, creating a standoff between state 
governments and religious sects. Given the credit a significant portion of 
the population gives to religion, this conscious disobedience risks 
rendering the law illegitimate.133 In the former scenario, the state’s 
compelling interest more or less vanishes, and in the latter, it may be 
outweighed by an even more compelling interest in refraining from laws 
that respected members of society will certainly disobey. 
Finally, churches requiring confession may encourage its observance 
by assuring the penitent that his communications will be guarded by a 
sacred trust. A state’s requirement that clergy betray that trust destroys 
confidence in religious leaders, and will (and should) have the actual 
effect of chilling the incidence of confession altogether. As potential 
penitents begin to realize their confessions will not be kept confidential, 
they will refrain from confessing and the assumption that clergy are in a 
unique position to obtain information regarding child abuse by virtue of 
possible, should not ever be acted on or spoken of in any way.” CANON LAW COMMENTARY, supra
note 16, at 536. 
133. As a perhaps imperfect analogy, compare the sodomy laws of the various states before 
Lawrence. The blatant disregard for the illegality of the conduct and the refusal to enforce it on the 
part of the states was cited as support for striking them down. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
569–70 (2003).
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their position as a spiritual adviser dissolves away. Thus, even if the state 
has a compelling interest in protecting children and detecting their 
abusers, abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege cannot be 
expected to actually further that interest. Furthermore, to the extent the 
abrogation chills the penitent’s exercise of the rite of penance, the 
reporting requirement not only burdens the clergy member’s free 
exercise by mandating an affirmative violation of a religious tenet, but 
also burdens the penitent by discouraging him from observing an 
important sacrament. 
The arguments against the state’s compelling interest are, perhaps, 
persuasive, but on balance, the state probably demonstrates a compelling 
interest. Even if confessions ceased altogether, the clergy would 
probably have the same access to information as, say, a school teacher 
who enjoys a relationship of trust but is protected by no privilege and 
must report. The argument that full and frank confession should be 
encouraged applies just as easily to physicians, psychotherapists, and 
lawyers; but legislatures have decided to sacrifice that policy in this 
context in the hope that it will improve the state’s ability to protect 
children. From the state’s perspective, the challenger’s complaint that 
abrogating the privilege will chill confession is a policy consideration to 
be taken up with the legislature, not a constitutional argument to be 
decided by unelected judges. 
The Catholic argument that the priest actually lacks personal 
knowledge by virtue of his receiving the confession as God’s 
intermediary perhaps carries more constitutional bite. However, it 
disintegrates if it can be shown that the priest did anything with the 
information outside the confessional, such as removing the abuser from 
contact with children or attempting to resolve family problems. Clergy 
may often feel compelled to do something when they learn that a child 
has been or is being abused, particularly when the child’s, as well as the 
abuser’s, spiritual well-being is within the clergy’s responsibility as a 
member of the congregation.134 Any interference in an abusive situation 
134. Clergy may be caught in a Catch-22 on this point since the common law may actually 
impose some duty of care vis-à-vis identifiable potential victims of future abuse. In Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the University of California, a psychotherapist was held liable for failing to take action 
when a patient expressed his intention to kill a particular woman, notwithstanding the patient-
psychotherapist privilege. 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976) (“We conclude that the public policy 
favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must 
yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege 
ends where the public peril begins.”). Thus, the common law may require priests to take action 
notwithstanding their privilege. But if they do take action, their justification for failing to report 
under the statute disappears. The Tarasoff doctrine has not been followed in all states, see, e.g.,
Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1991), but it has been influential. See, e.g., Almonte v. 
N.Y. Med. Coll., 851 F. Supp. 34, 39–40 (D. Conn. 1994). Of course, imposition of a common law 
duty to warn potential victims in violation of an affirmative religious duty to keep confidences 
would be subject to the same constitutional challenges leveled at mandatory reporting statutes. 
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undermines the priest’s free exercise claim because the use of the 
information for any purpose would negate any claim that the priest lacks 
personal knowledge. Whether imposition of church discipline, such as 
excommunication or refusal of sacraments such as communion, would 
have the same effect is unclear since those punishments can perhaps be 
imposed without disclosing the confidential information or meddling in 
the abusive situation.
D.  Narrow Tailoring 
A better tactic, perhaps, than attacking the state’s compelling interest 
per se, would be to attack the breadth of the statute. Under the 
compelling interest test, the state must show not only that its interest is 
compelling, but also that it cannot be achieved by some method that 
would not impermissibly infringe free exercise rights. This part of the 
test allows the court to balance the state’s compelling interest against 
other considerations and could tip the scale in favor of those challenging 
the reporting statutes. Challengers could argue that the state’s interest 
may be served simply by narrowing the privilege so that only clergy with 
a sincere, religiously mandated duty of confidentiality may be relieved of 
their reporting obligation. 
As they stand, most clergy-communicant privileges are defined more 
broadly than valid constitutional arguments require. According to the 
reasoning of People v. Phillips and People v. Smith, the constitution 
requires confidentiality to be preserved only when refusing to do so 
would prevent the church from observing its sacraments—so churches 
that do not explicitly require secrecy of confession have no constitutional 
claim.135 The broader privilege advocated by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, and by many states, extends the privilege to all confidential 
communications made to religious leaders because sound policy supports 
the extension: obtaining spiritual guidance is perceived as a good thing, 
that guidance is most effective when the religious counselor has full 
information, and people are most likely to disclose full information if 
they can expect their secrets to be kept in confidence. The majority of 
states have recognized this policy in framing their reporting statutes, and 
all but two states have at least maintained it with regard to the attorney-
client privilege.136 However, the Constitution does not compel a state to 
135. See supra Part I.B. However, as discussed above, a substantive due process right to 
privacy might be argued to protect even those confessions made to clergy in religions that do not 
mandate confidentiality. 
136. Texas explicitly abrogates the attorney-client privilege for reporting, though not for 
proceedings. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 261.101(c), 261.202 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2002). 
Oklahoma’s statute simply states, “[n]o privilege or contract shall relieve any person from the 
requirement of reporting pursuant to this section.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7103 (1998 & Supp. 2006). 
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adopt such a policy; and states may depart from the policies justifying 
privilege at the peril of bringing the professions that bear relationships of 
trust into disrepute.137
Thus, states wishing to abrogate the clergy-communicant privilege in 
the context of reporting and testifying of known child abuse could simply 
redefine the privilege in that context so that it only applies to 
“confessions made in the course of discipline” of a clergy member’s 
church, as the original priest-penitent privilege statutes did.138 While this 
might raise important Establishment Clause concerns,139 doing so would 
substantially fulfill the state’s interest in detecting child abuse without 
burdening the free exercise of religion. As an example, Texas’s statute 
might be revised to read: 
The requirement to report under this section applies without exception 
to an individual whose personal communications may otherwise be 
privileged, including an attorney, a member of the clergy, except for 
confessions made in the course of discipline of the church to which the 
clergy member belongs, a medical practitioner, a social worker, a 
mental health professional, and an employee of a clinic or health care 
facility that provides reproductive services.140
Under such a statute, ministers of religions that did not have official 
doctrines mandating secrecy of confession would still be required to 
report even if the information is normally privileged, ministers of 
churches with such doctrines would still have to report non-confessional 
communications (even if they would normally be confidential), and the 
state’s interest in gathering evidence and protecting children would be 
Oklahoma’s statute includes attorneys as mandatory reporters under the catch-all phrase, “other 
person.” Id. Thus, while it is not clear that the legislature specifically intended to abrogate the 
attorney-client privilege and while the Oklahoma Practice Guide does not include “communications 
regarding child abuse” in its list of exceptions, 1 OKLA. PRAC. at Ch. 5, § 2502 (2006–07 ed.), the 
language of the statute appears to be unambiguous. 
137. It would seem that, as a matter of fundamental fairness, professionals such as 
psychotherapists and lawyers should at least have a duty to warn their clients if certain confessions 
will not be kept confidential when the client reasonably expects the communications to be kept in 
confidence. On the other hand, perhaps the existence of the mandatory reporting statute gives child 
abusers notice that they cannot expect confessions of child abuse to be kept secret. 
138. See supra Part I.B. 
139. A thorough discussion of the Establishment Clause concerns is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. However, since it is mainly hierarchical churches that have official confidentiality 
doctrines, the question of establishment could become more troublesome if the privilege not to 
report is extended to the clergy of some churches but not all. Also, establishment issues might be 
implicated if the government must get entangled in questions of church doctrine. 
140. Texas’s Rule of Evidence establishing the privilege is broad, protecting all confidential 
communications made to “a member of the clergy in the member’s professional character as spiritual 
adviser.” TEX. R. EVID. 505(b). Thus, the suggested revision would only apply in the context of child 
abuse reporting. 
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largely served. The accommodation would protect religiously mandated 
duties and no more. 
Another solution to the problem would be to require those claiming a 
privilege to disclaim any right to act on the information they receive in 
confession beyond one-on-one counseling in the confessional setting. For 
Catholics, at least, one of the main justifications of the Seal of 
Confession is that the priest learns of the confessions not in a personal 
capacity, but as God’s minister. Confession, in essence, reflects a 
personal prayer to God but with the benefit of God’s direct response 
through a priest.141 The priest’s role as an intermediary prevents him 
from using “in any manner for external governance the knowledge about 
sins which he has received in confession at any time,”142 including the 
initiation of church disciplinary proceedings. Thus, as long as the priest 
stays true to this doctrine, his silence has no effect whatsoever on the 
truth-seeking process—to the rest of the world, it is as if the confession 
never happened.143 On the other hand, if the priest uses the contents of 
the confession to meddle in the affairs of either the abuser or the abused, 
his actions do have an effect on the truth-seeking process. He has left the 
realm of the sacrament and entered the realm properly controlled by the 
state—policing behavior. 
Whether any churches other than the Catholic Church would qualify 
for this kind of treatment would depend on their official doctrines. 
However, it seems likely that at least a substantial number of religious 
organizations would value immediate protection of children over their 
commitment to confidentiality, particularly where abuse is ongoing. 
These churches would not necessarily seek to adopt official doctrines 
that would qualify for the exception. 
Furthermore, this standard would apply only to communications 
made in the context of a confession of sin. Concerned spouses or parents 
who approach clergy for advice or victims of abuse seeking protection 
probably communicate with religious leaders outside of this context—
that is, their communications are more precisely complaints, not 
confessions—leaving the clergy member free to report without fear of 
violation of religious tenets. 
141. See 1983 CODE c.978, § 1 (“In hearing confessions the priest is to remember that he is 
equally a judge and a physician and has been established by God as a minister of divine justice and 
mercy, so that he has regard for the divine honor and the salvation of souls.”).
142. 1983 CODE c.984, § 2. 
143. I do not argue that the priest should not counsel the penitent in the confessional. Indeed, a 
minister of God would almost certainly encourage the penitent to take the steps necessary to repent 
of her sins. Perhaps a clergy member would even encourage the penitent to turn herself in to secular 
authorities. However, this counseling function is qualitatively different from instances where the 
clergy member, himself, takes steps outside the confessional to attempt to fix the situation. In the 
former situation, the onus of action is on the penitent, in the latter, the clergy member takes upon 
himself the responsibilities that rightly fall to the state. 
146 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 24
The narrow approach would also quell the objections of states that 
wish to avoid the potential ambiguity in statutes that provide an 
exemption for privileged information. Whether a particular 
communication is protected would be clearly restricted to actual 
confessions. External signs of abuse such as bruises, broken bones, and 
so forth could still be enough to initiate the duty to report, regardless of 
whether the clergy member has heard a confession of abuse. Were the 
clergy member to be put on trial for failure to report, the prosecution 
would simply have to prove the member’s awareness of these signs 
without reference to any confession. On the other hand, if the clergy 
member were subjected to discipline from his church for reporting abuse 
related to a confession, he could defend himself by pointing to external 
signs that gave him knowledge or reasonable suspicion of the abuse 
outside the confessional. 
Overall, a narrower definition of the priest-penitent privilege (i.e., a 
privilege that protects only confessions made in the course of discipline 
of the clergy member’s religion) would protect the free exercise rights of 
clergy members without seriously negatively affecting the state’s interest 
in detecting child abuse. States, which in general prefer a broad clergy-
communicant privilege, would not need to narrow the privilege in all 
contexts, but instead simply reduce the privilege’s scope in the context of 
mandatory child abuse reporting. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Complete abrogation of the clergy-communicant privilege in any 
context should be considered a violation of the constitutional rights to 
free exercise of religion. However, the state’s interest in protecting 
children through mandatory reporting laws may be accomplished without 
infringing these rights simply by limiting the privilege. As long as 
religious organizations can point to official doctrines mandating 
confidentiality and do not assume the responsibility of remedying 
problems of abuse, they may claim an absolute right to refuse to disclose 
confidential communications. Beyond that, however, the state may 
properly assume its role in policing its citizens’ behavior.
Regardless of the constitutional question, abrogating policy-driven 
privileges of confidentiality may have serious consequences for both the 
reputation and the effectiveness of certain professions. As with some 
prescription drugs, the side effects may be worse than the symptoms. It is 
surely not coincidence that, of the states that have chosen to abrogate 
professional privileges in the context of mandatory reporting, only two 
have ventured so far as to do away with the attorney-client privilege. 
This privilege deserves special protection because of attorneys’ unique 
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responsibility to stand as advocates for their clients and their potential to 
encourage individuals to do the right thing of their own free will. The 
clergy member receiving confession plays these same roles and the 
guarantee of confidentiality deserves strong protection. While child 
abuse is despicable, and should be eradicated to the greatest extent 
possible, legislatures should weigh carefully the good that will actually 
be done by removing these privileges against the violence it will do to 
the clergy member or lawyer’s position as a trusted confidante. 
Removing the priest-penitent privilege in the context of child abuse casts 
doubt on the efficacy of the privilege in other circumstances as well and 
will have a chilling effect on confession and full disclosure. This side 
effect makes abrogation of the priest-penitent privilege a bitter pill 
indeed. 
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